This post has been pulled up by MvdG: please take the time to read Marc’s post and comment on it.
- For some time, I’ve thought about writing a book (or, at least, a lengthy essay) comparing the world of the 1930s to our own. At long last, I’ve started to put
As a child growing up in the 1950s, I developed an interest in foreign affairs that has lasted to this day. I was barely four years old at the outbreak of the Korean War and can remember sitting at the child-size desk my parents had just purchased for me, pretending I was John Cameron Swayze (NBC’s first television anchorman) reporting on the conflict. I can also recall staring out the window, thinking that somewhere far, far away people were fighting and killing one another. These were not and are not the activities of the typical four-year-old. I have no idea why I was different.
By the time I was a teenager, I had become fascinated with the events leading up to World War II. Too young to recognize that I was benefiting from hindsight, I could not fathom how it had been allowed to happen. Were statesmen – particularly British statesmen and especially Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain – so stupid (the word I used then) or myopic (the word I use now) that they could not see where things were headed? In my bookcase today is a first printing of William L. Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. It was bought for me when I was fourteen. I literally devoured its 1,245 pages.
Now, a half-century later, I stare out my window and see a world having troubling resemblances to and reminders of the 1930s. At first glance I may be viewed as a scaremonger, as today’s threats – catastrophic terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the nexus between them – may seem to be less severe than those posed by Germany, Italy and Japan seven decades ago.
In this book, I investigate these resemblances and reminders to show that today’s threats are not insignificant when compared to those of the 1930s. I do so in the hope of influencing those who share what I believe to be an ill-conceived complacency regarding our future security. The Iraq war has trumped 9/11 in the consciousness of many politicians, opinion leaders, academic and think-tank experts, and a sizable portion of the public. The most troubling legacies of the war are that it has led to the widespread disillusionment in our government and uncertainty regarding America’s role in the world.
My approach is to focus heavily on contemporaneous accounts of events. While the history of our time is yet to be written, histories of the 1930s are bountiful. The limitation of these and other histories are that they are written when outcomes are already known. No matter how hard an author may try, knowledge of how things turn out cannot be erased from his mind. That knowledge influences how an author evaluates the perceptions and policies of the actors involved in the historical drama he portrays.
Such evaluations are of course valuable – to current policymakers, in particular. However, it is not my intent to include in this book still another scathing, retrospective criticism of the foreign policies of the Western democracies in the depression decade. What interests me are the views that were set forth as events unfolded. The events of the 1930s – from Japan’s establishment of a Manchurian puppet state (1931) to Germany’s invasion of Poland (1939) and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) — unfolded one at a time. After each step along the road that would ultimately lead to war, governments, opinion leaders and publics in England, France, and the United States could do no more than speculate as to what would happen next and respond accordingly. It was destination unknown, as it has always been and as it is now.
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